Suckers, Cheaters and Grudgers

            Throughout chapter 12 Dawkins carefully explains and analyzes a game called Prisoner’s dilemma. The game consists on having to options: either choosing to cooperate or to defect with your opponent/partner, none of the players may see the action chosen beforehand and therefore they must wait until the turn ends. If both cooperate then each receives an equal reward, if both defect each receives a lesser reward or even a punishment. However if one defects and the other chooses to cooperate, the one who defected earns a greater reward than if both cooperated and the one who foolishly cooperated gets the worst reward or punishment. Through this game Dawkins analyzed human behavior and selfishness using various scenarios. For instance, let’s take the prisoner’s one: if two men have been accused of murder but not enough evidence has been collected all the authorities may rely on is that both suspects tell on each other. Before they can make any agreement each is brought to the interrogation room separately,  as the interrogation develops both men betray each other and present substantial evidence that gets them both heavily convicted. This would be an example of a double defection in the game. Had the two men chosen to cooperated with each other the sentence would have been a much more lenient one. Yet, as explained by the selfish gene theory we instinctively think of our wellbeing alone and how we might get betrayed. Not only is this the natural reaction because we might be saving ourselves by blaming everything on the other guy, but because if we cooperate and he defects, he will be saved and I the one who cooperated will get the worst conviction.

            We played this game in class after reading the chapter. Although not as intense as manipulating a conviction, we took to another level by putting our own grade at risk. We would be given five rounds to play, if one cooperated and the other defected the “traitor” got a .5 bump, if both cooperated each earned a .3 bump and if both defected a .1 deduction would take place. When the preliminaries begun, since our grade was not at risk we did not betray each other and played more freely and my partner and I were loyal to each other. Nonetheless, when the finals took place things changed completely. Logically, the best option would have been to cooperate on all the five rounds so each would get a significant increase, but our selfishness came into play. None of the finals round proceeded without one defect. In fact, the first round were five straight double defections, the following two had one player who betrayed the other on the fourth or fifth round. Just like in the scenario we had no way of making an agreement to ensure we wouldn’t naively be cheated through defection, so most of us fell to temptation.

            This game impeccably portrays society and the way many partnerships end up breaking up due to mistrust. Ideally, both parties could equally benefit from the agreement and end up as winners. But we always want more, or in some cases to do less. If we somehow may manage to do less work and earn equal recognition we will do it, or less work and more rewards we will do it as well. Simple selfish gene theory. This where being a sucker, grudger and a cheaters comes into play. A person who would constantly choose to cooperate regardless of being cheated continuously, will unequivocally be exploited and never benefit. Cheaters would lose their partners’ trust as soon as they cheat them once, the grudger effect will finish them off and neither will receive the benefits. Either option will result in detrimentally for at least one party involved. Rationally, the best option would be to cooperate as much as possible, but society simple does not work that way and cheaters end up winning all the time. Even grudgers who know they might get cheated again, may trust a cheater repeatedly to save an enterprise or an important investment. This game accurately simulates conflictive decision making and how temptation may overpower goodwill, even at a “friend’s” expense.